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Abstract  
Beginning in the early 1990s, neoliberalizing reforms have significantly 
impacted the urban space of Lima in terms of an increase in business activities and 
the intensification of sociospatial asymmetries. Considering the modernization of 
urban political economy along neoliberal lines as an important dimension of 
contemporary disputes, this paper treats urban neoliberalism as a lived experience 
shaped by multiple sociospatial interactions, politico-ecological tensions and 
creative reactions. For instance, uneven performance of public water services 
across social groups and different urban zones seems to be consistent with the 
nature of neoliberal urbanization, in that the persistence of inequalities represents 
an active mechanism for the functioning of economy, politics and society 
according to market-friendly priorities. In that context, the marginalized, low-
income urban periphery is the main space where promises, protests and 
dissatisfaction with neoliberalized public services occur, and actively contribute to 
the reconfiguration and contestation of the neoliberal megacity.  
                                                
1  Published under Creative Commons licence: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 
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Introduction  
Lima represents an emblematic case of the complex dilemmas associated 
with large-scale urbanization in Latin America, the region with the second highest 
level of urbanization (UN-Habitat, 2010) and the starkest inequalities in the world 
today (Roberts and Wilson, 2009). The Peruvian capital is an emerging megacity 
with a population of more than nine million people, projected to grow beyond ten 
million by 2030 (United Nations, 2014). The problems of metropolitan Lima have 
their origin in a long trend of violence and negligence perpetrated against nature 
and society since colonial times (Székely and Montes, 2006). Social and spatial 
inequalities in the capital city parallel long established disparities between groups 
living in coastal and inland areas of Peru. Those inequalities have increased in the 
last two decades, when the sociospatial configuration of Lima came increasingly 
under the influence of macroeconomic stabilization plans. Since 1990, national 
development and economic growth have been shaped by national and international 
neoliberalizing pressures in favour of deregulation, open markets and the 
unconstrained exploitation of natural resources (especially minerals and fossil 
fuels). These recent economic reforms have produced a perverse balance of gains 
and losses that is constantly hidden by aggressive ideological constructions around 
the lack of alternatives and the supposed universal benefits of market globalization. 
Lima’s unfolding geography offers an illustrative example of a fast emerging 
megacity that has not resolved, or even addressed, intricate questions left from 
colonial, early independence and national-developmentalist periods (Jones, 2006); 
at the same time mainstream modernization approaches are uncritically adopted 
and aggressively promoted.  
What follows is a critical discussion of the repercussions of recent economic 
adjustments and political trends on the organization and functioning of Lima. The 
aim of this article is to analyze the process of urban neoliberalization as reinforcing 
contrasts and inequalities between affluent, semi-periphery and periphery areas, 
and more importantly as a lived experience shaped by multiple sociospatial 
interactions, politico-ecological tensions, creative reactions and survival strategies. 
The limits of the ongoing reforms are particularly evident in the failure of public 
water services of metropolitan Lima, as the sector became a laboratory for market-
friendly solutions (obviously mediated by the national state). Some international 
mass media may now give a more positive image of Lima than in previous 
decades2, but water management troubles represent a critical moment of truth. 
Human-made water scarcity constitutes a biophysical and sociopolitical limit to the 
mainstream intention to convert Lima into a global megacity and a bastion of 
neoliberalism. The capital has increasingly to rely on degraded and meagre water 
reserves (i.e., groundwater, three small watercourses and tropical glaciers in the 
                                                
2 For instance, the CNN report “Wire the desert: The next generation of smart cities”, published on 18 Dec 
2014 at http://edition.cnn.com/2014/12/18/business/smart-cities-next-generation/index.html#top_of_page 
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Andes under the impact of global warming), which is a situation that has triggered 
a number of infrastructure expansion programmes with, at best, partial results. 
Departing from the existing literature on Latin American megacities – which 
is currently focused on social fragmentation (the ‘city of walls’) and widespread 
violence without sufficient attention to idiosyncratic socioeconomic patterns and 
hidden reactions – the present text combines different spatial scales (national-
metropolitan-local) with a sectoral experience (water) in order to question the 
overarching trends and mounting risks of the expansion of neoliberalising 
pressures. It will therefore provide an overview of the politicization of urban spaces 
through an assessment of public sector insufficiencies and renewed forms of social 
exclusion and uneven development. The metropolitan experience will be described 
as a function of broader neoliberalizing processes, the struggle for political 
hegemony and also group or interpersonal relationships. National and international 
trends have had a discernible impact on the daily lives of individuals and families 
trying to make sense of past and present urban changes. The marginalized 
periphery is the main space where promises, protests and dissatisfaction with 
neoliberalized water services come about and take an active part in the 
reconfiguration, and contestation, of Lima as an emerging megacity. 
The empirical analysis of neoliberal urbanization and its impact on water 
services provided later in the paper is based on initial fieldwork carried out in 2009 
(Mar-Jun) and a second fieldtrip in 2013 (Mar-Apr). The research included visits to 
low-income areas, attendance at public events and interviews with policy-makers, 
planners and managers of public utilities (21), NGO activists (12), representatives 
of multilateral development agencies (9) and local residents in three areas in the 
periphery of Lima (26 interviewees). The great majority of respondents were 
community leaders, people with many years of residence in the areas, and those 
involved in government plans and projects. Interviews were transcribed, coded and 
analyzed in Spanish (with the extracts included in the text translated into English). 
Additional contacts with key informants (via email and telephone) and the 
assessment of policy documents and databases continued over a two year period. 
The research coincided with the election of the mayor of Lima in 2010 (Susana 
Villarán) and the new president of Peru in 2011 (Ollanta Humala). 
The paper will first review the academic literature on Latin American 
urbanization and the appropriateness of the megacity concept. The discussion will 
then focus on the specific circumstances of Lima, particularly since 1990, which 
has been a period noticeably marked by neoliberalizing policies and novel 
mechanisms for the circulation and spatial accumulation of capital. For the purpose 
of the present analysis, neoliberal urbanization is considered a dynamic process that 
combines state-oriented and market-oriented approaches, as well as the 
deregulation and reregulation of public services and the labour market. Neoliberal 
urbanization is primarily managed by the state apparatus (despite ideological calls 
for the minimal state by the ideologues of neoliberalism) and is predicated on the 
interconnection between local, national and international scales. The paper’s third 
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main section considers the insertion of the public water services of Lima into the 
sphere of neoliberalized urbanization, despite the apparent contradiction caused by 
the failure to privatize the metropolitan water utility (SEDAPAL). The relationship 
between the reform of the water sector and Lima’s transition into a megacity is 
demonstrated with reference to results from three peripheral urban settlements. The 
concluding section argues that the megacity’s problems constitute a relevant 
chapter in the urban geography of Latin America, given the complexity of the 
interactions and magnitude of its recent political, economic and social initiatives.  
Latin America’s Challenging Urban Geography 
The attributes and functions of large cities reflect the incessant, and 
profoundly dependent, interlinkages between local, national and international 
spheres of interaction. The ‘urban’ is a specific arena of dispute, creativity and 
confrontation, which are all sociospatial phenomena that require appropriate 
theorization (Saunders, 1981). In that sense, conventional interpretations typically 
fail to provide a coherent understanding of interrelated urban problems and 
potential solutions at different scales, from local to global. Scholars associated with 
urban planning and economic development policies, for example, concentrate their 
attention on operational, morphological and technological questions (e.g., the 
bureaucratic supply of housing, transport and other public services) as opposed to 
political, economic and ideological issues responsible for faulty services and poor 
quality of life. Suffice to note that such academic approaches have been the main 
source of inspiration for conventional policy-making, tax regimes and prevailing 
legislation which have proved incapable of responding to mounting socioeconomic 
and environmental demands. Alternative readings are offered by authors who 
emphasize the connection between urban questions and the capitalist logic of 
production and realization of social and cultural values, as a reaction to 
technocratic, market-driven and market-oriented forms of knowledge and 
intervention (Brenner, 2009). The spatialization of class struggle (Harvey, 2009) 
and the exercise of political hegemony through the production of urban spaces 
(Lefebvre, 2003) turn out to be important areas of critical scholarly research. This 
second group of scholars has underscored the politically and ideologically 
mediated evolution of urban space, as well as the links between environmental 
justice and urbanization (Schweitzer and Stephenson Jr, 2007).  
Nonetheless, if critical authors do well in emphasizing the intricacies of the 
northern capitalist city, there is still limited understanding of  the details of 
urbanization and metropolitan growth in the ‘peripheries’ of capitalism (Legg and 
McFarlane, 2008). The focus has been on Western processes of urbanization 
(particularly in North America), something that is unfortunately evident in the 
otherwise interesting collection organized by Lévy (2008). The sporadic attention 
given to Latin American cities exacerbates the unfortunate condition of social 
fragmentation and endemic violence. That is partly, but not only, due to language 
barriers and the academic biases of Anglo-American universities. More 
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importantly, it is commonly ignored by critical scholars that, notwithstanding the 
obvious differences between cultures and countries, the Latin American city is an 
analytical category with distinctive forms, functions and problems (Gilbert, 1998), 
which cannot be interpreted adequately with concepts and investigative approaches 
not directly related to the region’s sociocultural and economic processes (Williams 
Montoya, 2009). To make matters worse, the modest, but often original work of 
Latin American academics has been undervalued or simply ignored in northern 
academic circles (Valladares and Coelho, 2003). The result is a lasting demand for 
conceptual and methodological approaches able to reconcile urban processes in 
Latin America with wider development pressures, sectoral demands and local, 
interpersonal relations. To a large extent the Latin American urban question has 
remained something like a Sphinx still waiting to have most of its riddles 
deciphered. 
In that regard, the emergency of megacities is a question of great importance 
in Latin America and entails a particular challenge for geographers and other urban 
scholars. Many large-scale urban areas in the region are now turning into, and some 
have already become, megacities of global socioeconomic relevance, but also 
fraught with idiosyncratic complexities. The term ‘megacity’ has great 
interpretative significance here, because it should encapsulate the uniqueness of 
social relations and management challenges associated with massive urbanization.3 
Megacities have typically been defined as conurbations with populations exceeding 
eight or ten million (Guest, 1994), but more important than the size of its 
population or the vastness of its spatial territories is the thickness of functions and 
networks (Buijs et al., 2010) and the peculiar complementarities between formal 
and informal economies (Daniels, 2004). The megacity is a crucible for the supply 
of food, energy and resources to a diversified, internationally connected and 
demanding population. It is also a hotspot for business and investments, political 
disputes, cultural manifestations and collective learning. Although being the most 
important centres of industrial production and capital accumulation, these are also 
the first areas to suffer the consequences of recurrent economic crises (Portes, 
1989). Therefore, further studies are certainly needed both to assess the fractures of 
Latin America megacities (Rodgers et al., 2011) and to address the apparent 
dichotomy between an urban nucleus and a fragmented, sprawling periphery three 
times greater than central areas and largely self-produced by the poor (Rolnik, 
2001). Among other causes, the multiple inequalities present in the Latin American 
megacity seem to have a long genesis in the slavery system, the brutal conquest of 
territorial resources and the unequal offering of social opportunities (Luco and 
Vignoli, 2003). 
The prominence of regional megacities has coincided, not by chance, with 
the introduction and evolution of neoliberal ideologies and practices throughout 
                                                
3 The concept of megacity was first proposed by the Scottish city planner Patrick Geddes as far back as 1915. 
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Latin America. That has happened through a ‘contingent necessity’ between the 
reform of national economic policies and the neoliberal restructuring of urban 
spaces (Ioris, 2012a). The sub-continent has been a testing ground for 
experimentation with neoliberalizing strategies typically associated with growing 
circulation of capital and tendencies towards a service economy (Sassen, 1991). 
The consequences of neoliberalism for the Latin American megacities are highly 
unique (Shatkin, 2007) with remarkable sociospatial and environmental impacts 
intersecting with the long tradition of socionatural exploitation (Jaffe and Aguiar, 
2012). The expansion of privatization, the formation of public-private partnerships, 
the fragmentation of decision-making and the flexibilization of labour have 
aggravated both earlier and more recent problems. Even when neoliberal initiatives 
sometimes temporarily reduce the polarized tendencies between rich and poor 
settlements, segregation has risen on a micro-scale due to the production of 
enclosed landscapes, the loss of public spheres and changes in citizen habits 
(Janoschka, 2002). Despite its evident shortcomings, urban neoliberal governance 
regularly strives to hide its instabilities and fractures by posturing as strong, robust 
and logical manifestations of improved management, constantly trying to correct 
excesses and adjust itself to new situations (such as the post-2008 global financial 
crisis).4  
It should be noted that the Latin American megacity is not merely the imprint 
of a nationwide or globalized socioeconomic order, but its own organization has 
also been predicated upon circumstantial patterns of inclusion and exclusion 
operating at both the neighbourhood and metropolitan level. If the concentration of 
activities and people in a few metropolitan areas has been the result of policies and 
tariffs informed by the neoliberal doctrine, the phenomenon has been metabolized 
according to local sociopolitical circumstances (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 
2008). At any rate, the promises of globalized neoliberalism have been only 
marginally fulfilled in large Latin American urban centres, which never became 
truly ‘global cities’ (Roberts, 2005), but remained involved in long-lasting 
processes of foreign dependency and subordinate economic development (Córdoba 
Ordóñez and Gago García, 2010). Yet, most approaches to the Latin American 
megacity have failed to recognize that globally- and nationally-driven economic 
development are largely vested in the periphery of the large metropolises (Aguilar 
and Ward, 2003). It has been neglected that low-income populations living in the 
sociospatial periphery of large cities show surprising resilience, and respond with 
tremendous creativity to the available political, social and spatial opportunities 
(Arana, 2001). Whereas the marginalization of large contingents of the population 
has given rise to gang formation and drug cartels, it also produces a fertile ground 
for the amalgamation of cultures, values and experiences (Young, 2010). The 
creativity and energy of the urban poor certainly did not put an end to their 
                                                
4 I am indebted to David Wilson for highlighting this important point.  
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exploitation, but have helped to mitigate some of the worst aspects of chaotic, 
unfair urban development (Kruijt and Degregori, 2007). 
In order adequately to interpret the complexity of the Latin American 
megacity under neoliberalizing pressures, it is necessary simultaneously to tackle 
the entirety of processes that connect the local and personal with higher scales of 
interaction (Ioris, 2012b). Explanatory binaries (e.g., between formal and informal 
sectors of the urban society) need to be rejected in favour of more complex in-
between social spaces and historical periods (Varley, 2013). The Latin American 
megacity requires the creative use of an explanatory ‘matrix’ formed by cross-scale 
and multi-thematic relationships. Lefebvre (1996) observes that the dialectical 
explanation of the city should be open and flexible, something that brings together 
the contradictory, as well as connects theory and practice. An investigation into the 
complexity of Latin American metropolises also needs to address the centrality of 
political demands and the failure to produce sustained and meaningful inclusion at 
the local, urban and national scales. The ‘right to the Latin American city’ 
(paraphrasing Lefebvre’s celebrated thesis; see Lefebvre, 2003) depends primarily 
on the consolidation of democratic institutions and the construction of a more 
inclusive society, which has so far been systematically denied by the advance and 
revitalization of neoliberalizing experiences. The rapid expansion of Lima in recent 
decades has largely frustrated the prospects of sociospatial justice, which is 
examined below in relation to neoliberal policies and then changes in the water 
sector.  
Neoliberal Pressures and the Reshaping of Lima  
For several decades, between the 1930s and the 1980s, there was a steady 
influx of people from other coastal areas and from the Andean mountains in search 
of better socioeconomic opportunities in Lima. The absence of coherent planning 
and insufficient infrastructure investments forced migrant groups to find alternative 
forms of housing, and to develop multiple coping strategies, in the growing number 
of irregular settlements (initially called barriadas and, later, asentamientos 
humanos (human settlements)). Around 40% of Lima started as barriadas, which 
have always been spaces of both hope and despair (Chambers, 2005). Living 
conditions were notoriously difficult in the barriadas because of their location in 
hilly or sandy terrains, the low income of the families and the precariousness of 
transport and water services (Harris Jr., 1971). Towards the end of the 1980s, 
Peruvian society – particularly the working population and those in the barriadas – 
was noticeably tired of the unsatisfactory socioeconomic results of state-led 
development and the serious failures of macroeconomic policies. The exhaustion of 
developmentalism and import substitution industrialization championed by the 
national state during most of the 20th Century had major consequences for the 
organization and administration of Lima. 
The decade was marred by economic stagnation, fiscal fragility, policy 
disorder and hyperinflation, which were magnified by the heterodox measures 
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adopted by the government of Alan García (1985-1990) as a last attempt to manage 
the worn out developmentalist agenda. The negative consequences of national 
economic instability were particularly evident in Lima, where 18% of the homes 
were without electricity and 36% with no piped water provision; 110,000 derelict 
dwellings were in danger of collapse due to poor maintenance (Riofrío, 1996). The 
level of poverty and social inequality reached a crisis proportions due to 
widespread violence, chaos and corruption (Figueroa, 1998), which only 
aggravated the poor state of impoverished buildings in the city centre and of the 
poverty-ridden barriadas. This period was also marked by terrorist acts of 
insurgent guerrillas, in particular the Maoist group Sendero Luminoso (Shining 
Path), well known for indiscriminate murder, assassination of members of rival 
popular movements and attacks on the metropolitan infrastructure (e.g., destruction 
of electricity towers around Lima). In such a difficult context, the urban poor 
struggled to maintain class consciousness and sustain protests against the adverse 
social and economic condition, normally revealing a complex political attitude that 
combined patterns of conservatism, and occasionally, popular radicalism (Stokes, 
1991).  
Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), the unexpected winner of the 1990 
presidential election, came to office without any coherent plan of action, but was 
quickly led to adopt a draconian programme of state reforms, privatization and 
economic adjustments. Although some hesitant neoliberal initiatives had been tried 
by President Fernando Belaúnde in the early 1980s, Fujimori was by far the 
primary champion of neoliberalism in Peru. Between 1991 and 1998, a 
comprehensive privatization strategy sold more than 200 state-owned companies, 
as well as companies’ shares, that amounted to US$ 8.86 billion (Contreras and 
Cueto, 2007). After the 1992 autogolpe (self-coup), the already precarious 
democratic regime became in practice semi-dictatorial, which allowed an easy 
approval of a new constitution in 1993 with strong incentives to private ownership 
of public assets (including landed property), and facilitated access to foreign 
investors. The role of the government was increasingly reduced to one of general 
management and business promotion, while the private sector was expected to 
operate more freely. The principles of the neoliberal adjustment programme were 
in effect as orthodox as the Chilean model introduced a few decades earlier by 
General Pinochet, but its implementation in Peru was negatively affected by the 
lack of sectoral policies and by the inflexible management of government agencies 
(Gonzales de Olarte, 1998). In addition, neoliberal policies produced huge 
contradictions and serious imbalances. For example, Lima was exposed to a deluge 
of foreign goods, including second-hand minibuses and cars shipped from the Far 
East, while the country continued to export mainly traditional, primary 
commodities. The capital city was launched into a trajectory of mass consumption 
and globalized cultural influences, which inevitably affected values, relationships 
and loyalties (Grampone, 1999). Wages fell to levels that made it difficult for 
families to sustain themselves and triggered the diversification of labour portfolios 
and even international migration (Massey and Capoferro, 2006). 
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In terms of the urban development of Lima, Fujimori’s focus was on the 
expansion of the real estate market increasingly under the influence of private 
construction and management companies (Peters and Skop, 2007). The notion of 
household as a right was absent from the 1993 Constitution, and the new policies 
regarded houses basically as market assets. Fujimori dismantled the mutual system 
inherited from the previous administration (that operated under the management of 
the Banco de la Vivienda (Housing Bank) that, in any case, had primarily supported 
investments in the middle class areas of the city) and also removed other assistance 
mechanisms for low-income neighbourhoods and the barriadas (Calderón 
Cockburn, 2005). Key decisions about urban policies were progressively 
centralized in the hands of the national government at the exclusion of the 49 
municipal authorities that form the metropolitan region of Lima (research 
interview, city council officer, May 06, 2009). A new national agency called 
COFOPRI was established in 1996 (with financial backing from the World Bank), 
with responsibility for granting land titles and regularizing urban settlements. 
COFOPRI’s purpose was informed by the ideas of De Soto (1986), who claimed 
that the formalization of land tenure would energize commercial transactions in a 
city that had the largest informal sector in the world (in proportion to its 
population). De Soto basically theorized that the triumph of capitalism depended 
on people having property titles and being able to trade them freely. His approach 
has been criticized for ignoring the role of collectivist approaches based on 
common land, and also because property values rise after titling and cause housing 
again to be unaffordable for the poor (Bromley, 2004).  
The ideological influence of De Soto nonetheless prevailed and, 
consequently, COFOPRI repeatedly attempted to stimulate the circulation of 
capital through the concession of loans for the acquisition of family properties. In 
practice, COFOPRI created opportunities for siphoning public funds to real estate 
barons and commercial banks, especially because of home loan foreclosures and 
the displacement of families from the more precarious and vulnerable barriadas 
(Leonard, 2000). Fujimori also systematically manipulated the granting of property 
titles according to his electoral ambitions, especially because it was easier for the 
president to secure votes in the crowded periphery of the capital than in the remote 
provinces (interview, planning officer of the metropolitan administration of Lima, 
April 29, 2009). In the second half of the 1990s, around half a million titles were 
granted by COFOPRI, but the number of invasions aimed to establish new 
barriadas in Lima was higher than ever. In the period between 1993 and 1998 
alone, a total of 208 additional barriadas were established (Calderón Cockburn, 
2005), the majority located on steep slopes prone to erosion and landslides (as in 
the upper parts of Comas, Chorrillos, Villa María del Triunfo and especially San 
Juan de Lurigancho) (see Figure 1). In 1998 Lima had 1,980 barriadas with more 
than 2.6 million inhabitants and around 38% of the metropolitan population 
(Calderón Cockburn, 2005).  
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Figure 1.  Overview of the periphery of Lima (photo by A. Ioris) 
Due to the growing connection to globalized markets, new spaces had to be 
created for the small, but highly influential, population elite (Chion, 2002). In the 
central areas of the city, neoliberal housing renovation was influenced by North 
American architecture styles, which resembled the previous experience at the turn 
of the 20th Century, when Lima had been remodelled according to French and 
English aesthetic preferences to satisfy the demands of the wealthier strata of the 
population (Ludeña, 2002). The most emblematic architectural project of the 
neoliberal phase is probably the shopping centre Larcomar, built in 1998 in the 
scarp of Miraflores, with investments of more than US$ 40 million (see Figure 2). 
High-income residences and service offices were increasingly accommodated in 
multi-story buildings (e.g., international banks and companies in the affluent 
neighbourhood of San Isidro), while the low-income areas of the city continued to 
expand horizontally, up the hills and in ever more distant locations. In effect, the 
growing circulation of money, commodities and information that followed 
neoliberalizing policies did little to mitigate the stratification of social and political 
opportunities (Roberts and Portes, 2006), while inequality, unemployment and the 
informal economy increased significantly (Díaz Orreta, 1997). Because of 
escalating levels of crime, city enclaves in the form of gated communities became 
common features in high and medium income areas (Plöger, 2007) (see Figure 3). 
These were a clear indication of structural inequalities shaping the modernization 
of Lima. 
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Figure 2. Larcomar shopping centre in Miraflores (photo by A. Ioris) 
Notwithstanding investments in the modernization of affluent areas, for 
those living in the barriadas and other peripheral neighbourhoods access to public 
services and a reasonable quality of life still remained a daily problem at the end of 
the Fujimori administration (Joseph, 2005). According to SASE (2002), only 11% 
of the settlements regularized by COFOPRI in 2001 had acceptable standards of 
public services (i.e., water, sanitation, telephone, streets and housing construction 
material). Parks and recreation areas were progressively privatized, in tandem with 
restrictions in the access of low-income people to shopping centres (essentially 
through ‘face-control’ and the exclusion of suspicious mestizos) (Plyushteva, 
2009). Urban violence became an ever more serious issue; between 2000 and 2011 
the rate of crimes increased by 80% in Lima, while kidnaps increased by 196% and 
homicides by 233% (according to the Observatory of Criminality of the Attorney 
General’s office.5 Instead of isolated problems, those circumstances were 
associated with the economy’s neoliberalization and deteriorating income levels of 
Lima’s workforce in Lima between 1987 and 2002, especially among non-
unionized, informal workers (Verdera, 2007). 
                                                
5  Database available at www.mpfn.gob.pe 
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Figure 3. Gated Communities in the municipality of Chorrillos, an increasingly 
common feature of Lima (photo by A. Ioris) 
After the turbulent political transition that followed the unforeseen 
resignation of Fujimori (caused by devastating evidence of large-scale and 
systematic corruption), a new president – US trained economist Alejandro Toledo 
(2001-2006) – came to office promising to overcome the political and economic 
shortcomings of the previous governments, which had left the capital fraught with 
institutional uncertainties, poor policy coordination and deteriorating 
environmental conditions. In 2006, under Toledo’s instructions, the public fund 
MiVivienda started to finance the purchase, improvement and construction of 
popular households. Other projects and plans were also launched with the purpose 
of alleviating the housing deficit (e.g., Techo Propio, Bono Familiar Habitacional). 
However, the perverse side of those initiatives was over reliance on the private 
sector for the construction of new housing units, while the state largely withdrew 
from direct construction interventions. Under free market competition, builders 
showed a preference for middle class residences instead of less profitable units for 
the low-income population (interview, national government policy-maker, May 17, 
2009). In governance terms, decentralization and democratization only marginally 
improved in Lima, because national government authorities retained a firm control 
over decisions and resources (Dietz and Tanaka, 2002). 
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The manipulation of urban planning to assist primarily the interests of 
private investors and the political goals of the elite took an even more distinctive 
and somewhat surprising turn during the second term in office of President García 
(2006-2011). In clear contrast with the confusing policies of his first government in 
the 1980s, García reinforced the pro-market strategies of both Fujimori and Toledo, 
which in practice meant prolonging high levels of sub-employment, exploitation 
and poor quality of life for most of those living in the peripheries of Lima. 
Although the rate of absolute poverty among the population of Lima decreased 
from 30.9% to 14.1% during the García administration, the level of inequality 
(calculated as Genie coefficient) remained practically the same during Garcia’s 
term of office (INEI, 2010). The prevailing argument of politicians and city 
planners was that persistent housing problems were the result of limited access to 
financial services (e.g., Gwinner, 2007), rather than an element of sustained 
political and social discrimination toward the low-income population. For instance, 
real estate investments continued to prioritize middle-class and upper-class 
neighbourhoods, whereas the majority of the population had to find its own means 
to finance the construction and augmentation of modest households (interview, 
community leader, April 05, 2009). The persistence of a very uneven urban 
landscape and the problematic attention to popular needs, despite the constant 
interventions of the central government in the housing sector and other municipal 
projects of questionable quality (typically without much coordination with local 
authorities), is considered by Riofrío (2010: 80) as an urban model of “housing 
without the city”, which was transferred from Chile to Peru alongside the 
neoliberal project. 
Other disturbing factors associated with the spread of neoliberalism in Lima 
were the entrenched racial divisions and the territorialized manifestations of racism 
by the European-descendant ruling elites. Racism remained a central feature of the 
social landscape of Lima, even if cleverly dissimulated by multiple discursive and 
figurative devices (Golash-Boza, 2010). It persisted in many forms even during the 
governments of the Japanese-descendant Fujimori and the Amerindian-descendant 
Toledo. Despite the apparent merging of cultures and the rhetoric of ethnic 
tolerance, prejudice against Indians, mestizos and Afro-Peruvians included subtle 
processes of discrimination based on personal characteristics and racial origin as 
well as economic, social and cultural attributes (de la Cadena, 1998). Either explicit 
or implicit, racism has obvious consequences in terms of asymmetrical access to 
public service, for example given the higher proportion of mestizos among the poor 
without access to mains water supply. The maintenance of class- and race-based 
discrimination has been helped by the decline of traditional forms of public 
organization and labour unionism. 
On the whole, structural and diffuse urban inequalities, which had 
characterized the earlier phase of national development and urban growth in the 
middle of the 20th Century based on the export of primary goods and import 
substitution, were magnified under the market-friendly ‘conservative 
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modernization’ of the capital. During most of the 2000s decade, the Peruvian 
economy maintained rates of economic growth around 6% per year, but the levels 
of inequality remained significantly high, while state investments in poverty 
reduction were on average much below the Latin American average (CEPAL, 
2010). If one of the main results of sustained neoliberal policies was to incorporate 
part of the city into the mass global society, large segments of the population 
continued to live in irregular settlements, depending on informal jobs and coping 
with high levels of uncertainty and socioeconomic risk. The (limited) industrial 
park of Lima lost economic importance and was partially dismantled in favour of 
the unrelenting commercialization of goods mostly imported from Asia. Even the 
election of President Ollanta Humala of a nominal left-wing party did not produce 
any significant change in neoliberal policies and their repercussions on urban 
trends. On the contrary, despite the circumstantial decline of poverty and social 
inequality, the pattern of uneven development (between urban and rural areas, and 
within metropolitan Lima) intensified, political institutions remained fragile and 
over-reliance on the export of primary commodities posed serious uncertainties 
about the future (Arana, 2014).  
It can be concluded that sociospatial inequalities in Lima are the result of 
several decades of socioeconomic instability and national development 
subordinated to the narrow interests of the middle classes and the small governing 
elite. Neoliberal reforms introduced since 1990, primarily to address 
macroeconomic instability and restore investment and growth, significantly 
impacted the landscape and functioning of the capital city. Those changes followed 
market-friendly priorities and, in the end, exacerbated existing disparities and 
imbalances. Marked asymmetries in terms of socioeconomic opportunities and 
political influence were translated into a more-or-less explicit pattern of housing 
segregation, uneven public services and disguised forms of racism. Political 
changes, from the semi-authoritarianism of Fujimori to the formal rule of law after 
the year 2000, did not produce any significant alteration in neoliberal priorities. 
Quite the opposite, the hegemonic ideology of free market globalization continued 
to affect both the national economy (increasingly reliant on the unregulated 
exploitation of mineral resources) and the urban processes of interaction. The 
growing troubles, as well as the contestation, of the neoliberalized modernization 
of Lima discussed in the previous pages can be more specifically understood with 
reference to the water industry, as analyzed in the following section. 
Water Problems in an Increasingly Neoliberalized Urban Context 
One of the most evident demonstrations of the tensions associated with 
neoliberalizing policies in Peru is the contrast between burgeoning economic 
activity and the persistent shortage of water in many parts of the capital city. Lack 
of public water services continue to affect the more distant and marginalized areas 
(where around 5% of population live without any access to mains water supply), at 
the same time that 48% of the households, in different sections of the megacity, 
still receive treated water of substandard quality (according to the Association for 
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the Promotion of National Infrastructure mentioned in RPP, 2013). Water supply to 
an ever-growing population is further compromised by the degradation of small 
river courses, the lowering water table and the deterioration of the hydraulic 
infrastructure. Lima’s water industry is, therefore, a privileged entry point into the 
achievements and limitations of neoliberalizing trends. On the one hand, it should 
be acknowledged that there is nothing new in the insufficiencies of public water 
supply in Lima, which became a particularly thorny issue with large-scale internal 
migration and fast urban expansion in the second half of the last century. On the 
other hand, widespread water shortage provided an important justification for 
government interventions, foreign loans and multilateral cooperation projects 
related to water treatment and distribution. 
The poor performance of water supply and sanitation services during the 
economic turmoil of the 1980s offered the needed excuse for incoming Fujimori to 
include SEDAPAL (the water company of metropolitan Lima) in the list of public 
utilities to be privatized (in this case, the option was for a long-term concession to 
private operators). Preparation for the utility’s privatization in the early 1990s 
initially attracted significant sums of public money to be used in the mitigation of 
the most urgent problems (which was helped by a World Bank loan of US$ 600 
million). Consumer tariffs skyrocketed due to the reduction of state subsidies, as in 
the case of water, telephone and other utility charges that increased by more than 
1,000% (Webb and Fernández-Baca, 1993). However, water utility privatization is 
never a straightforward and consensual choice in any part of the world. Because of 
political  faltering within the government (related to the complexity and the techno-
political risks involved) and low-key but widespread resistance among the general 
population, privatization was postponed several times and eventually cancelled in 
1997 (interview, activist and NGO manager, April 17, 2009).  
In any case, after the rigged ‘re-election’ of Fujimori authoritarian 
administration in 1995, SEDAPAL embarked on a large programme of operational 
recovery and closer association with the private sector. The water utility of Lima 
received US$ 2.44 billion of public funding (14% of total public investment and 
0.5% of GDP of the 1990s), mainly for pipeline replacement and leakage control 
carried out by private companies working for the national government (SEDAPAL, 
2005). Even so, water provision was still concentrated in higher higher-income 
areas, where 40% of Lima’s population consumes 88% of the city’s total water 
(CENCA, 1998). With the turbulent end of the Fujimori administration and the 
gradual, but timid, return to democratic rule under President Toledo, SEDAPAL 
faced a deteriorating financial situation, in spite of tariff increases of 97.4% from 
2001 to 2008 (interview, SUNASS manager, May 10, 2009).6 
Upon his return to power as a converted neoliberal in 2006, President 
García launched the programme ‘Water for All’ (Agua para Todos or APT), which 
                                                
6 SUNASS is the national regulator of water and sanitation services. 
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comprised an extensive portfolio of more than 1,500 engineering works in Lima 
with an announced budget of around US$ 2.3 billion. Most of the implementation 
was carried out through contracts, concessions and partnerships with private 
companies, while construction works were funded by a combination of foreign 
loans, private sector investments, selling of shares in the stock market and 
sustained tariff increases. The fragile basis of service expansion under the APT 
programme was emphasized in several of my interviews with SUNASS regulators 
and SEDAPAL staff. For instance, many of the projects ‘inaugurated’ under the 
APT label had actually been completed under previous government initiatives 
(interview, former SUNASS regulator, May 22, 2009). In addition, the repeated 
increases in water tariffs since the early 1990s enhanced the cost-recovery capacity 
and financial health of the utility, but did not improve the relation between 
SEDAPAL and the population of Lima. As mentioned in an interview with a 
former utility’s employee, the main channel of communication between the 
reformed SEDAPAL and the general public has really been the water bill. 
A highly sensitive issue associated with the APT programme was the 
mounting evidence of corruption practiced at all levels of the García 
administration. Corruption is an important element of the politicization of urban 
development because of the amount of money involved and also the electoral 
relevance of utility investments. In that context, as had happened during the 
Fujimori years, the APT programme was a main locus for corruption and populist 
gestures by Alan García (cf. various interviews with community leaders and NGO 
members, April, 2013). It was certainly no coincidence that most of the corruption 
accusations against President García – which were investigated by a dedicated 
commission in the National Congress established in 2011 – were related to projects 
and investments in water services carried out under the APT programme. With 
massive construction works in a short period of time and careless control of targets 
and payments, APT created favourable conditions for mismanagement and large-
scale corruption. The investigative commission was presented with incriminating 
testimony connecting corruption in the water sector with the fraudulent granting of 
pardon to convicted criminals and other serious offences. After long and 
contentious scrutiny, a final report was produced by the commission, which in June 
2014 resulted in the National Congress accusing García and members of his 
administration of corruption (conviction is highly unlikely due to the political 
allegiances of the Peruvian judiciary system).  
In order to uncover the impact of policies and large-scale investments on 
the daily life of those with problematic access to water services, I collected data in 
three study areas – Pachacútec, Huaycán and Villa El Salvador – in the so-called 
north, east and south ‘cones’ of Lima, respectively (see Figure 4). These three areas 
were selected because they constitute fast-growing settlements with relevant, 
representative experiences of organized protests and grassroots mobilization. 
Empirical results accumulated during several months of fieldwork vividly 
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demonstrate social transformations, collective reactions and growing tensions 
associated with the advance of urban neoliberalism. 
 
 
Figure 4. Lima and the case study areas 
Villa El Salvador, a large municipality founded in 1971 in the south cone of 
Lima, has been an internationally-celebrated example of bottom-up mobilization 
that resulted in significant achievements. Early initiatives were inspired by a 
commitment to common ownership of land and community work (faenas), values 
residents associate with ancient Peruvian civilizations. During interviews in this 
area, many residents of Villa El Salvador described the initial importance of 
grassroots campaigns to secure and expand water and sanitation in the area. But the 
same residents expressed frustration with the electoral appropriation of community 
organizations and the decline of neighbourhood collaboration. Through the years, 
public participation became increasingly bureaucratized and fragmented, which 
inevitably affected the availability and the administration of public services. It was 
observed by a resident that:  
There is a very clear reduction in community mobilization, we don’t 
have the same willingness to protest and participate in meetings as 
before. (interview, community leader and former mayor, Villa El 
Salvador, April 24, 2009)  
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The now modest, fragmented reactions of the low-income inhabitants to the 
inconsistencies and injustices of neoliberal strategies suggest an erosion of political 
leadership and the difficulty, under the pervasiveness of market-friendly ideologies, 
to promote alternative responses to the long-lasting problems of neoliberalized 
metropolitan development. One main consequence is that it was still possible to see 
private water vendors circulating around the area in 2013, serving that part of the 
population that lacked access to public water supply.  
Likewise in Huaycán, a large settlement that resulted from an ambitious 
project initiated in 1984 with the aim to give the lower social strata access to 
housing, the strength of grassroots mobilization has suffered from years of 
demagogic manipulation and misinformation used by politicians and policy-makers 
(particularly during the Fujimori years). In the initial phase of the settlement, water 
supply featured as a key element of the struggle for space in the emerging 
megacity. Some significant water works were built to store and distribute water to 
the growing number of houses, but in the 1990s the process was affected by 
changes in government policies and disorganization of community life under 
mounting political and economic pressures. Those problems were magnified by 
internal disagreements among community leaders and the difficulty to form more 
stable political alliances against the hegemonic pattern of urban development. The 
advance of neoliberalizing policies had considerable impacts on interpersonal 
relations and sociospatial interactions related to water allocation, use and 
conservation. There exists now a more formalist, distant connection between 
government and society (increasingly mediated by a commercial language of 
customer satisfaction and business administration techniques), which has 
contributed to growing demobilization of community strategies (according to 
various contacts with community leaders and NGO activists).  In an interview it 
was stated that: 
Previous community projects [in the past decades] were based on 
new technologies and required the organization of the community. 
The new projects may involve more visible interventions, but they 
don’t help to develop other ‘competencies’ [capabilities] or change 
behaviour or the relationship between our people. (interview, local 
resident, Huaycán, May 04, 2009)   
It is clear in this interview, and in other similar comments made by the locals,  that 
the population is definitely not passive, but able to perceive the trends of change 
and, while benefiting from construction works and government programmes, the 
residents also express a sense of uneasiness about the manipulation of public 
services by politicians and business groups. In the end, there is a strange 
combination of criticism and submission to the pressures of urban neoliberalism. 
Neoliberalizing trends led to the disorganization of social movements due to an 
aggressive ideology of individualism and entrepreneurialism, the over-exploitation 
of the workforce (who has less time for community-based initiatives) and also the 
positive results of some plans and projects. In addition, the steady marketization of 
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water services has significantly affected grassroots understanding of water 
problems, given that the residents showed an acute resentment towards large sums 
of money being invested in the central areas that still left behind marginalized, low 
income areas. This suggests that the intensification of business transactions around 
water goes much further than infrastructure projects, but increasingly permeates 
public perception of the value of water. The values associated with water are the 
outcome of profound interrelations between individuals and social groups engaged 
in the concreteness of urban areas. Water values are qualified attributes that 
materialize at the interface between individual and collective preferences, market 
and non-market demands and local and higher scales of interaction.  
Pachacútec, in the north cone of Lima, is a settlement created in 2000 with 
the national government-initiated transfer of a large contingent of the population 
from Villa El Salvador. It has experienced a similar process of community 
engagement to both Villa El Salvador and Huaycán, in the sense that strong 
activism was followed by a decline over several years due to political and 
economic pressures. Lack of public water supply was, since the first years, one of 
the main problems faced by the locals; consequently, Pachacútec became one of the 
priority areas for alternative water supply and sanitation schemes (such as the 
construction of community storage and distribution systems) supported by 
donations from foreign governments (e.g., Germany). However, there were serious 
problems with the management of these non-conventional schemes, particularly 
related to allegations of mismanagement of money or clashes with other forms of 
community organization (interview, NGO activist, April 13, 2009). Years later, at 
the time of the fieldwork for the present research, a micro-credit programme was 
again being tried in Pachacútec with the participation of a pool of national and 
international agencies (curiously, under the executive management of a religious 
American NGO). The rationale of this more recent initiative was to find solutions 
to water problems through the promotion of private business, especially the 
creation of a small sanitation market in Pachacútec. Local shops were therefore 
encouraged to sell sanitation equipment and toilet units, whist project promoters try 
to persuade the residents to commit themselves to a loan that is paid back over two 
or three years. However, instead of facilitating the improvement of water and 
sanitation, the micro-credit project was fraught with operational difficulties and 
failed to reach the large majority of households due to their low credit rating (Ioris, 
2012c). The experience of Pachacútec corresponds to wider neoliberal 
transformations in other parts of Latin America (Goldfrank and Schrank, 2009), 
where in order to contain potential grassroots revolts, many government policies 
involve cooptation and domestication of urban low-income groups via initiatives 
that aim to momentarily alleviate social exclusion but never address the underlying 
causes of social and economic inequalities (de Souza, 2009). 
These three areas share commonalities with many other parts of Lima, where 
the announcement of government investments and the promotion of new 
programmes related to water and sanitation were used to undermine the fragile 
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resistance against hegemonic urban policies. Modernizing projects have largely 
failed to address essential demands of the majority of the low-income population, 
but rather exacerbated internal divisions and left behind sections of the settlements 
without access to public water supply. On the other hand, despite multiple, 
unfulfilled expectations in many parts of the megacity periphery, those who are 
negatively affected by recent urban trends cannot be considered as passive victims 
of social and economic changes. Without romanticizing the urban poor and 
ignoring their internal antagonisms, it can be held that individuals and social 
groups develop, in unpredictable and often highly creative ways, peculiar 
understandings of their situations and actively take on the limited opportunities 
available. Likewise, the election of a left-wing mayor in 2010 (Villarán), despite 
the limited power and resources at her disposal, served to highlight the narrowness 
of national policies informed by neoliberal tenets. In any case, Villarán was 
replaced by her predecessor Luis Castañeda, who ran a populist campaign, 
supported by powerful groups, and won the majority of votes in the October 2014 
election. The future prospects of the Latin American megacity, Lima in particular, 
ultimately depend, on the outcome of the clashes between hegemonic policies and 
the daily struggle for recognition and sociospatial inclusion. 
Conclusions: Reinforcing and Challenging the Neoliberalized Megacity 
The previous pages examine some central elements of the conversion of 
Lima into an emerging megacity under the influence of neoliberalizing pressures. It 
proved to be a highly complex experience that connects, in contingent ways, past 
and present tendencies, as well as local, national and international spheres of 
interaction. The discussion initially centred around the impact of new urban 
policies on urban dynamics and on the organization of the different sectors of the 
metropolitan region. The capital of Peru constitutes a specific chapter of the urban 
geography of Latin America, especially because of a range of sociopolitical 
relationships that end up perpetuating and magnifying water scarcity and water 
management problems. If Lima, as an emerging megacity, has functioned as the 
catalyst of macroeconomic recovery and the insertion of Peru into globalized 
markets, it has also been the incubator of mounting tensions and the locus of 
multiple legitimating efforts by local and national elites. For instance, 
infrastructure investments and novel approaches to water services have been an 
integral element of an increasingly neoliberalized urban landscape where large 
sums of money circulate between state agencies and private companies, and the 
population is treated as utility customers.  
The experience of water supply in Lima shows also that the 
neoliberalization of Latin American cities happens not only through the formal 
delegation of services and utilities to the private sector. On the contrary, one of the 
main lessons learned from the research is that success of neoliberalizing strategies 
depends much more on the intensification and manipulation of investments, 
contracts and revenues in a way that allows the flexible involvement of national 
and international companies. In that context, claims about the pursuit of higher 
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levels of operational efficiency have attempted to hide a business-friendly 
environment and techno-bureaucratic rationality that systematically denies the 
underlying political causes of water scarcity. The mainstream discourse ignores 
that the contrasts between water services and the environmental impacts of 
different urban zones and social groups are not a mere deficiency of neoliberal 
urbanization, but represent an active mechanism for the functioning of economy 
and society according to conservative modernization priorities. In other words, the 
marked imbalances that shape the landscape of Lima are actively reproduced and 
even exacerbated in order to prolong the shelf-life of current urban policies and 
businesses activities. The intention to convert Lima into a modern and globalized 
Latin American metropolis is founded in those asymmetric geometries of power 
disguised as the new society of a prosperous Peru.  
Genuine alternatives to that long tendency of urban inequalities, reinforced 
by neoliberalizing adjustments since 1990, require not only a critical understanding 
of the connections between past and present, but also between personal and 
interpersonal attitudes with national and international scales of interaction. 
Consequently, there is a perennial need for conceptual and methodological 
approaches able to reconcile Latin American urban processes with wider 
development pressures, sectoral demands and sociospatial relations. Novel 
academic interpretations should deal with the failure of hegemonic urban policies 
anchored in mechanisms such as increased mass consumption, informal jobs and 
the influence of large corporations. The complexity of Lima calls for a nuanced 
analytical and methodological treatment able to identify the causes of persistent 
problems and alternatives for the future. In addition, the daily life in three studied 
communities of Lima indicates the weakening of community mobilization and 
widespread individualism as adjunct elements of the expansion of neoliberal urban 
transformations. Policy-making and investment programmes have been based on 
commercial-like relationships between public utilities and the general public, 
which end up reinforcing mechanisms of alienation and political disorganization. 
Critical scholars have, therefore, the responsibility to assess those complex, cross-
scale phenomena in a way that helps to remove pre-established conceptions about 
the origin of problems and possible solutions (as in the case of the conventional 
emphasis on additional water supply while ignoring the long, politicized trajectory 
of water scarcity). As observed by Harvey (2008: 23), the “right to the city is far 
more than the individual liberty to access urban resources: it is a right to change 
ourselves by changing the city”. Certainly the spatial and political disputes about 
the configuration of its large metropolises constitute one the most crucial debates 
concerning the present and the future of Latin America. 
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